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Fundamentally, then, there are no religions that are
false. All are true after their own fashion: All fulfill
given conditions of human existence, though in differ-
ent ways.
–Emile Durkheim, 
The Elementary Forms 
of Religious Life (1912 [1995])
Anthropologists have long known that alterna-tive states of consciousness (ASC; see Tart,1975; Zinberg, 1977; Laughlin, McManus &
d’Aquili, 1990; Cardena, Lynn & Krippner, 2000) are
an important factor in the lives of peoples all over the
planet. For instance, during the latter 1960s, Erika
Bourguignon (1973; Bourguignon & Evascu, 1977),
an anthropologist at Ohio State University, completed
a number of holocultural studies of ASC using samples
of cultures drawn from George Peter Murdock’s
Ethnographic Atlas (1967). In these studies she found
that roughly 90% of the 488 societies sampled exhibit
institutionalized techniques for evoking trance states
of various kinds. In virtually all of these cases, alterna-
tive states of consciousness were considered by peoples
to be both positive and sacred in nature. These data are
so impressive that they have led scholars to suggest that
our species seems to have an inherent drive to alter its
state of consciousness in often extraordinary ways (see
e.g., Young & Goulet, 1994; Forman, 1998).
What we want to do here is suggest an explanation
for the ubiquity and importance of culturally pre-
scribed ASC and certain common transcultural ele-
ments of traditional1 cosmologies from the viewpoint
of Fisher Information. We will argue the notion, first
put forward by Emile Durkheim in his magnum opus,
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, (1912 [1995];
see also Throop & Laughlin, 2002) that all religions
are grounded to some extent in reality. We will show
that many structural elements of traditional cosmolo-
gies are similar and that the ritual induction of cultur-
ally sanctioned ASC is often able to bring individual
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The majority of the world’s cultures encourage or require members to enter alternative states of
consciousness (ASC) while involved in religious rituals. The question is, why? This paper suggests
an explanation for the culturally prescribed ASC from the view of Fisher information. It argues
from the position, first put forward by Emile Durkheim in his magnum opus, The Elementary
Forms of the Religious Life, that all religions are grounded in reality. It suggests that many of the
structural elements of cultural cosmologies are similar and that the ritual induction of ASC may
help to bring individual experience into greater accord with a pan-human eidetic cosmology, and
thus with certain invariant attributes of reality. The necessity of this process is demonstrated by
recourse to Fisher information. The paper shows how experiences generated during alternative
states of consciousness may help to maintain a minimal level of realism in the interests of adap-
tation to what is in other respects a transcendental reality.
experience into greater accord with transculturally
shared elements of an eidetic cosmology by way of a
sociocultural feedback loop. We will demonstrate the
necessity of this process by recourse to Fisher informa-
tion, and show how experiences generated during
alternative states of consciousness may help to main-
tain a minimal level of realism in the interests of socio-
physiological adaptation to what is otherwise a tran-
scendental reality.
ASC, Eidetic Cosmology, Extramental
Reality and the Cycle of Meaning
Alternative states of consciousness may vary enor-mously, from lucid dreaming and contemplative
states to shamanic soul flights and vision quests
(Bourguignon, 1973; Winkelman, 2000; Dobkin de
Rios, 1984; Dobkin de Rios & Winkelman, 1989;
Laughlin, 1989, 1994a, 1994b; Forman, 1998). To
induce these states of consciousness, many societies
prescribe the use of psychoactive drugs, although such
use seems mostly associated with groups having more
simple forms of political organization (Winkelman,
2000). It is important to recognize that ASC may be
evoked with or without the use of drugs, and may be
the result of often complex arrays of neuroendocrine
“driving” mechanisms embedded in religious rituals
(Laughlin, McManus & d’Aquili, 1990). The impor-
tant point for the present argument is that socially
sanctioned procedures for evoking ASC are a near uni-
versal aspect of cultures around the world.
Cycle of Meaning
With the exception of alcohol and drunkenness,ASC are almost never sought in traditional
societies outside the context of socially prescribed and
supervised ritual circumstances. The reason for this
seems clear enough. Any human experience is open to
a multitude of interpretations. The same experience
may be seen as negative and destructive in one context
and as positive and wholesome in another. Societies
that encourage ASC tend to embed these experiences
within the context of a cycle of meaning (Laughlin,
McManus & d’Aquili, 1990; Laughlin, 1997, 2001)
so as to control both the range of experiences that
occur, and the interpretation of those experiences as
they occur. To this end, interpretations are often
couched in terms of the society’s world view in such a
way that the experiences evoked are seen to confirm
and enliven that world view.
A society’s world view is for the most part carried
around in the minds of people, which of course per-
meates their bodies by way of their nervous systems.
Individuals often experience their world view in the
form of stories, songs, aphorisms, and sacred and dra-
matic scenes, as well as techniques and other patterned
responses. In literate societies, these sources may be
committed to writing and form a sacred canon and
associated actions. Either way, a world view is
expressed and enacted in various kinds of mythopoeic
forms including art and iconography, ritual, dramatic
production, pilgrimage, and so forth. The most pow-
erful expressive aspect is of course ritual performance
(d’Aquili, Laughlin & McManus, 1979), and it is
within this context that extraordinary states of con-
sciousness are most likely to arise. Rituals may incor-
porate a variety of neuroendocrine “drivers” such as
drumming, hallucinogenic herbs, flickering lights,
fasting, fixed concentration, sleep deprivation, painful
ordeals, chanting, prolonged dancing, etc. When alter-
native states of consciousness do occur as a conse-
quence of participation in a ritual, there is almost
always a process by which culturally appropriate inter-
pretations are laid on the experiences evoked therein.
These interpretations are derived from and tend to
reinforce the efficacy of the world view. For instance,
Moroccan dream interpreters normally account for the
events described to them in terms consistent with the
Koran.
In short, we see that the relationship between a
particular world view and the varieties of experience
evoked in the context of a society’s various rituals is
characterized, at least ideally, by a relatively conserva-
tive feedback system—a cycle of meaning—in which
the world view is expressed symbolically in ways that
give rise to ASC, which in turn are interpreted in terms
of the world view. Mind you, this kind of system is a
living tradition, not a mechanical contrivance, and
that means it is far more flexible than it might appear
in any simplistic formulation. In fact this pairing of
experience and knowledge allows for change within
and over generations such that both the experiences
that occur and the interpretations associated with
them allow for a “revitalization” of the world view in
every age (Wallace, 1966). In addition, cultural knowl-
edge is always to some extent refracted through the
lens of individual consciousness—a consciousness that
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is always patterned according the experiential residues
accrued though the course of a particular life trajecto-
ry (see Hollan, 2000; Obeyesekere, 1981; Throop,
2003). Indeed, it is often through processes of person-
alizing cultural knowledge—a process Obeyesekere
(1981) has termed “subjectification”—that novel
interpretations and experiences are able to arise, which
may, given the appropriate circumstances, later serve
to transform the existing cultural system. 
Eidetic Cosmology
Elsewhere, we have argued that at the heart of manytraditional cosmologies, no matter how divergent
they may appear in detail, lies a system of transcultur-
ally shared themes and elements we termed an eidetic
cosmology (Laughlin, 2001; Laughlin & Throop,
2001). This eidetic cosmology refers to those shared
elements underlying the myriad forms of cosmologi-
cally informed world views across the planet. We will
not take the space here to repeat the arguments we
offered in support of this theory. Suffice it to say that
the eidetic cosmology derives from the fundamental
structures of human consciousness and represents our
species-typical neurocognitive adaptation to both
physical and social reality (see Boyer, 1999, on the
notion of “intuitive ontology”; Count, 1973, on the
“human biogram”). 
Elaborating somewhat from what we wrote else-
where, below are some of the elements that would
seem to be characteristic of the eidetic cosmology, and
hence may each serve in differing degrees to pattern
the content of various world views around the globe. It
is important to note that in introducing the concept of
eidetic cosmology we do not wish to suggest that this
cosmology exists as an independent “thing” apart from
aggregates of individual minds and bodies. Ultimately,
the concept of eidetic cosmology does not refer to a
mind-independent “something,” but, more accurately,
serves as a place holder for what we argue are basic cor-
respondences between the structures of experience, the
structures of consciousness, and the structures of reality.
And these correspondences are not limited to peoples
dwelling in more “traditional” societies, but are char-
acteristic of cosmological world views across a broad
spectrum of societies. Because the elements of eidetic
cosmology are inherent in the structure of the human
nervous system, they will of course impact the under-
standings of individuals living in industrial and post-
industrial societies as well, and as a consequence, we
find these elements appearing in both scientific and
philosophical formulations; for instance, as quantum
physicist Harold E. Puthoff (2002) of the Institute of
Advanced Study in Austin, Texas, notes, the more we
learn about the quantum universe, the closer our sci-
entific picture of reality becomes to that of many tra-
ditional cosmologies. The elements of which we are
speaking include the following,
1. Reality is energetic. Reality is understood to be a
plenum void filled with sacred energies that moti-
vate the world of appearances and that may from
time to time be available for people to experience
directly and use. This void may be metaphorically
associated with “ocean” or “wind.”
2. Perception is limited. People understand that there
is more to reality than can be sensed. Sometimes
what we call the “waking state” is considered to be
limited vis a vis other states in which there is the
perception of divine or spiritual events.
3. Invisible domains. Much of reality is invisible and
may be made manifest only by way of ritual proce-
dures. Perceived events are linked to invisible
forces.
4. Reality is unitary. Reality is seen as a single system
—hence a cosmology—in which everything is
interconnected.
5. Dependent causation. Everything that occurs is
related causally to everything else in reality.
Everything that happens is caused to happen.
6. Serial and cyclical time. People will experience time
as both a lineal flow and a recurring cycle. Nearly
all languages reflect these two types of temporality.
7. Magical causation. Because of number 5, the
dependent causation factor, ritual procedures may
be used to make things happen, both at a distance,
and perhaps backwards in time.
8. Control procedures. People may exercise some
measure of control over events in reality by utilizing
the correct ritual procedures that tap into systematic
interconnection and dependent/magical causation.
9. Multiple realities. Reality is considered to exist on
different planes or in different, but mutually inter-
connected domains (see 4 above). 
10.Objects and relations. Whether visible or invisible,
reality is understood to be filled with objects and
relations between objects, as well as movement
among objects.
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11. Microcosm-macrocosm. Every object or being in
reality is considered to be a microcosm of the
whole of reality—both as an energetic entity and
in terms of the systemic properties that make
things whole.
12. Cardinal directions. Space is considered to be vec-
tored in such an ordered, even geometrical way
that entities may be placed within the totality of
space relative to each other.
13. Somatocentric. Related to number 11, cosmolo-
gies tend to be somatocentric—that is, the human
body or being is placed at the very center of
things. The body is considered to be the micro-
cosm par excellence.
14. Sense of the divine or god(s). People have a sense
of a divine presence which may be manifested in
one or more gods, spirits, radiant beings, etc.
15. Syzygistic complementarity. Cosmic energy is
divided into the male and female principles,
which normally interact in a complementary and
unitary way. Often symbolized by male and
female deities or other iconic forms interacting in
a holistic fashion.
While this is not an exhaustive list of the attributes of
eidetic cosmology, it will give the reader a feeling for
the elements we are speaking about. It is our con-
tention that interactions between alternative states of
consciousness and the eidetic cosmology often operate
to bring experience and interpretation into adaptive
accord with many of the invariant attributes of an
extramental reality (see below).2 This ASC-eidetic cos-
mology relationship is indeed comparable to what
Durkheim was working toward in his writings on rit-
ual, collective effervescence, and the formations of the
categories of thought. What Durkheim failed to grasp,
however, was that the ritual procedures that produced
“collective effervescence,” produced adherence as
much to physical reality as to social reality. He may be
forgiven this oversight, for in fact the impact of relativ-
ity theory and quantum mechanics had yet to be felt
in physics, and the predominant science in his day was
a very Newtonian and mechanical view of the world.
We are no longer hampered by the Newtonian world
view in science, however, and the more we learn about
physical reality behind the world of experience, the
more it resembles the world depicted in traditional
cosmologies worldwide. Of course we realize that
physicists’ insights into the world of quantum physics
are also mediated through some sort of
experiential/phenomenal datum, even if it is an
abstract mathematical formula.
Extramental Reality
By extramental reality we are referring to both thoseaspects of reality that effectively transcend our
subjective experience and those that serve to limit the
range of possible experiences had by any one given
experiencer. In terms of the former definition, we are
referring to all aspects of reality, including the state of
our own being, as they are, apart from our knowledge
or perception of them. This definition implies that
there are aspects of reality that we as humans do not,
and perhaps in principle cannot, know. To this end,
extramental reality can be thought to consist of infor-
mation that is “denied” us either because of limitations
inherent in the structure of our sense organs and nerv-
ous system, or because of limitations set by the state of
our current techniques/technologies. With regard to
the latter definition, we are referring to those aspects of
reality that conform to what Edmund Husserl charac-
terized as the “objective pole” of experience. According
to Husserlian phenomenology, experience is structured
according to both subjective and objective poles (see
Berger, 1999; Idhe, 1977), where the “objective” vari-
eties of experience are understood to correspond to
those aspects of reality that can be grasped by any
given experiencer regardless of cultural, historical, or
social position. From this perspective, while there are
certainly a number of differing ways that extramental
realty can be grasped by any one individual experi-
encer, the “objective” or “obdurate” quality of the
extramentally given in experience serves to set a defi-
nite limit on the kinds of experiences that any individ-
ual can have. Of course it is also true that in the case
of the perception of external objects, individuals can
shift from perceptual (both in the introspective and
extrospective senses) to strictly imaginal modalities
and as such be relatively unencumbered by the imped-
iment of the extramentally given.3
That said, it is important to note that in introduc-
ing the concept of extramental reality we do not wish
to fall into the long-standing philosophical trap of pos-
tulating a necessary, insurmountable gap between our
conscious experience of the world as given and the
world-in-itself; a gap that is perhaps most famously
recognized in philosophy in the context of Berkeley
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and Locke’s debate over the distinction between pri-
mary and secondary qualities.4 Following Husserl (and
to some extent Berkeley), we argue that extramental
reality is not necessarily an absolutely mind-independ-
ent “material” or “stuff ” forever beyond our experi-
ence. Instead, our knowledge of reality is importantly
based upon the interpenetration of percept and object,
what Husserl described as the potential for a partial
confluence between noesis (acts of consciousness),
noemata (contents of consciousness), and hyletic data
(information derived from extramental reality, aspects
of which become the objects of our intentional acts).5
Of course, our lot as humans is to be perpetually lim-
ited by the partial, fragmentary, and perspectival state
of our knowledge of the world, and as such, what we
might term a horizon of ignorance perpetually ensures
the “non-completeness” of correspondences between
our systems of knowledge and the realities towards
which they intend (Ricoeur, 1991).
Fisher Information
Now we want to show how the relationshipbetween individual experience and cultural sys-
tems of knowledge may be related to extramental real-
ity in a very necessary way. We want to explain why the
ASC–eidetic cosmology relationship is not only trans-
culturally common, but, in certain contexts, necessary
and sufficient to guarantee an adaptively minimal level
of truth value to human knowledge. Before going
much further, however, it is important to distinguish
the effort after truth from the effort after meaning (see
Bartlett, 1932). As we argued elsewhere, 
The effort after truth shifts the orientation from
attributing meaning to the given to discovering
what is novel in the given and then evaluating
meaning models by comparison with the given’s
experienced novelty. In other words, the effort after
meaning is a quest for an ordered patterning of
experience with a recognition of the correspondence
between an experienced given and the instantiation
of that given in memory, while the effort after truth
is a systematic search for anomaly in our experience
of a particular given as it arises in the sensorium
(Laughlin & Throop, 2001, p. 714). 
Another way to understand this is from the perspective
of a formulation that is quite well known in statistics,
and to some extent in genetics and physics, but that to
our knowledge has never been applied in anthropolo-
gy. That formulation is called Fisher information,
named for the famous geneticist and statistician R.A.
Fisher6 who first proposed it (Frieden, 1998). 
Fisher Information–
On the Technical Side
Fisher information is deceptively simple.7 Accordingto the Academic Press Dictionary of Science and
Technology, Fisher information is “a measure of the
amount of information about a parameter provided by
an experiment with a given probabilistic structure.” In
other words, Fisher information is a method of esti-
mating how close the information in our description
of reality conforms to the information contained in
reality itself. Thus Fisher information involves a kind
of Kantian epistemology with I representing what we
know about phenomena, and J representing the infor-
mation clustered in the “neumena” (in Kant’s view, the
extramental reality behind apperception). While most
applications of Fisher information have been in the
physical sciences where it has proved invaluable in cri-
tiquing experimental designs, the central insights of
the theory are applicable to any system of observation
and theory construction.
Fisher information does two things for a theory of
observation: 
1. Fisher information is a measure of the ability to
estimate a parameter, and
2. Fisher information is a measure of the disorder
within a system or phenomenon.
In other words, the information we have about the
world is the difference between the amount of infor-
mation in the world and the amount of information
the world is “willing” to let the inquiring mind find
out—i.e., the amount of information we can possibly
access given the limitations of the our mindbrain and
our techniques/technologies. Fisher information is the
estimate of this discrepancy—a sort of measure of
indeterminacy.
Fisher information is simply labeled “I.” I is the
information one can obtain from a system under
observation. Suppose a researcher wants to know how
many families in Culture X conform to a post-nuptial
residence rule (say, virilocality). The researcher applies
her field methods and comes up with a statistical
measure of percentage—say 85% of families seem to
be conforming to virilocality at time t. But there is no
such thing as a perfect measure. There is always some
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room for error due to random disorder, environmental
fluctuations, influences from outside the system,
effects of doing the measuring, research design, etc. I
then will not actually be 85%, but rather a bell curve
that builds-in all these sources of error around your
measure of 85%. I is a kind of uncertainly principle—
in fact the method has been used to generate
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (i.e., if you want to
know this, you can’t know that). 
The system we wish to examine, be it a society, an
institution, a social dyad, a ritual activity, a perform-
ance—whatever—is part of the extramental world we
wish to understand, and the world is often seemingly
“reluctant” to give up information about itself. From
the Fisher information point of view, the world is full
of information and it is this information we are trying
to obtain by acts of knowing. The information that is
bound up in the extramental system we want to under-
stand is labeled “J,” and the amount of this informa-
tion we are able to obtain (I) is always only partially
isomorphic with J. Ideally, we want to minimize the
discrepancy between the information contained in the
system (J) and the amount of information we are able
to retrieve from the system (I); the goal is thus to have
I minus J be as small as possible.
Fisher information then is a compromise between
the subjective process of knowing and our sense of the
“out-there-ness” of any given extramental reality (all
real systems are “in-formed” and “in-forming”; see
Varela, 1979). Also implied by Fisher information is
that we in a sense create our own world of I (from the
perspective of cultural neurophenomenology, I exists
as a part of our “cognized environment;” see Laughlin,
McManus & d’Aquili, 1990, p. 82) when we observe
the world. Paraphrasing Princeton University physicist
John A. Wheeler, observation gives rise to information
and information gives rise to anthropology (or any
other science). Moreover, in a very real sense, we deter-
mine the answers we get from the world by the very act
of extracting information from the world. Our acts of
observation (be they through experimentation, survey
research, in-depth interviews, participant observation,
or other means.) influence the curve of error that is I.
It is more or less this insight that led philosopher of
science Paul Feyerabend (1993) to argue for support-
ing many competing theories in science, for the more
theories we have, the more methodologies—and the
closer we will get to the truth. 
Put in other words, for every system S of interest
to us, there is information J within S and there is the
information I about S that we can acquire, given the
methods and technologies, etc. available to us. That
means that we must be clear about (1) estimating the
parameters of S, and (2) how close to the total infor-
mation within S we can come, given the errors and
limitations built into our means of observation. Ideally
we want to minimize the discrepancy between I and J
for any and all Ss we wish to understand.
Fisher Information– 
In the Watermelon Patch
In order to make Fisher information less technicaland perhaps a little clearer, let us imagine we are a
little kid who has sneaked into his neighbor’s water-
melon patch and intends to steal a watermelon to eat
on a hot, lazy summer afternoon (Laughlin was raised
in Arkansas and this scene resonates strongly with his
childhood experiences). Our goal is to pick out a
watermelon that is ripe and sweet tasting, but we can-
not hang around the field for fear of being caught.
How do we make sure that the watermelon we pinch
is perfect? There are several methods we can use, chief
among them being “thumping” and “plugging.”
Thumping involves tapping hard on the skin at vari-
ous places on the melon and listening for a character-
istic hollow sound that indicates ripeness. But a ripe
melon is not necessarily a tasty melon. So we will want
to take out our pocket knife and cut a plug out of the
melon and look at, smell it and taste the meat. If it isn’t
to our liking, we will replace the plug and move on to
another fruit. But even if the meat on the plug is ripe
and tasty, how sure can we be that the entire melon is
in that state? Perhaps we will cut one or more addi-
tional plugs, and with each additional sampling of the
meat, the more confident we become that we have
indeed found the perfect melon.
Now, let us assume that the extramental world is
the watermelon and that it contains information J that
we wish to acquire—namely the overall quality of the
melon. In order to get at J, however, we have to make
individual observations, and from those observations
construct an interpretation I. Thus each thump or
plug is an I, which is a kind of window onto the J of
the watermelon. The more Is we obtain, the more con-
fidence we have in our overall knowledge of J. Still, no
I can equal J, for in this respect J is transcendental rel-
ative to all possible Is. J is transcendental in that it
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“withholds” information from us—“withholds” in the
sense that the extramental world is too vast, too com-
plex, too dynamic, and largely able to eclipse our senses
and technologies. In other words, the watermelon rep-
resents the Kantian neumenal world and the information
we derive from thumps and plugs represents our obser-
vations of the phenomenal world.
Trueing, Modeling, and 
Fisher Information
Our position is founded upon the assumption thathuman consciousness is organized according to
an inherent drive to minimize the discrepancy between
I and J, that is, to seek out and know the truth of
things. We know the truth of things by neurophysio-
logically modeling extramental reality and by testing
our models in the crucible of experience (Laughlin &
d’Aquili, 1974; Miller, Galanter & Pribram, 1960;
Pribram, 1971; Varela, 1979; Edelman, 1987, 1989;
Changeux, 1985). Truth, or more properly the process
of trueing, is the natural inclination of any conscious
organism to minimize the I-J discrepancy—the dis-
crepancy between mindbrain models and reality—in
the interests of adaptation (Laughlin & Throop,
2001). At a most basic level, our minds have evolved
over countless millions of years to know reality as accu-
rately as possible in order to find food without becom-
ing food. This inherent neurophysiological drive to
know reality we have elsewhere termed the “cognitive
imperative” (Laughlin & d’Aquili, 1974; Laughlin,
McManus & d’Aquili, 1990). According to this frame-
work, any neurocognitive or cultural process that oper-
ates to minimize the discrepancy between I and J may
be termed a truer.8
Of course, in speaking of a neurophysiological
drive to know reality we do not wish to imply that cul-
tural and social realities are not equally as important to
adaptation as physical realities are. The work of
Clifford Geertz (1973) is most helpful here. Geertz’
stance is based on the insight that the products of col-
lective human mentation (artifacts, tools, communica-
tive systems, etc.) and the social processes through
which these products are brought into being must be
considered part and parcel of the environment in
which the human mind evolved. According to Geertz,
it is only once we admit the context of an environment
tangibly modified by human sociality and creativity
that we are able to properly assess how selective pres-
sures could begin to favor those individuals best able to
create, acquire, and manipulate such artifacts. It is
important to note that for Geertz, “cultural artifacts”
include not only such physical products as “tools,” but
also the systems of significant symbols and cultural
“programs” which serve to direct and control human
interaction. In other words, Geertz proposes that it is
impossible to understand the evolution of the human
psyche without taking into consideration the extent to
which the environment, which serves to establish the
parameters for natural selection, is thoroughly perme-
ated with the cultural products of an increasingly com-
plex human mind.9 According to Geertz, we must thus
postulate an adaptive complementarity between the
structure of the human mind and the historically crys-
talized forms of collective mentation that mediate our
access to extramental reality and resides in extra-somatic
systems of significant symbols.10
That said, it is also important to recall that the
human brain does not begin life, as was once believed
by psychologists such as William James, as a “boom-
ing, buzzing chaos” or as a “blank slate” upon which
the truth of the world is passively written. On the con-
trary, the neuropsychological structures that develop
through childhood to become the adult mindbrain
have their beginning in rudimentary, genetically pro-
grammed organizations of neural cells (Laughlin,
1991). We call these highly organized, nascent neural
structures neurognosis (see Laughlin, McManus &
d’Aquili, 1990). To the point of our argument here, it
is upon neurognostic models, which actively mediate
mental imagery and cognitive and perceptual associa-
tions, that a great deal of mythology is grounded. 
From this perspective, while it is the case that
myth frequently takes the form of a narrative, the
structure of myth is essentially nonlinguistic—it is
neurocognitive, a knowing standpoint, a structure of
consciousness. Myths tell a story, but while language is
the most common medium for telling stories, myths
may be expressed via other mythopoeic forms as well
(e.g., drama, pilgrimage, art, and games). All living
myth, as Levi-Strauss (1964, 1971) repeatedly empha-
sized, exists within the minds and bodies of people.
From this perspective, individual expressions of myth
are understood to be instantiations of the myth’s eidet-
ic form, just as a performance of a symphony is but
one iteration of what would otherwise be its “ideal”
form in the mind of the composer or conductor.
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Culture As Fisher Information
Because humans are social primates, it is necessaryto integrate the role of culture more explicitly into
the model we have built here. This requires some dis-
cussion, for there exist many definitions of “culture,”
not all of which would be appropriate for our purposes
(see Kroeber & Kluckholn, 1952, for a classic study of
different definitions of culture). But many anthropol-
ogists have found it sensible to view culture as a system
of information (e.g. Roberts, 1964; d’Andrade, 1984;
Shore, 1996), and this is an orientation that we can use
to good effect—as long as we divorce the concept of
information from the contemporary, technological
sense of the term (see Endnote 5). Information in the
sense we are using here derives from the traditional,
pretechnological sense of the word—what Varela
(1979) referred to as “in-forming”—and involves the
internal organization of individuals, cultures, and real-
ity. It is important to note that this pre-technological
view of information is far from purely cognitive, since,
for the human nervous system, information includes
the organization of structures that mediate meaning,
intuition, sensation, emotion, imagery, and thought.
Perhaps the first to view culture in terms of infor-
mation was Ward Goodenough (1954, 1971), who
took his model of culture by analogy from genetics. As
a species consists of a gene pool, so too do societies cre-
ate “culture pools”—or information pools—for their
members (Goodenough, 1971). People learn their cul-
ture (they become enculturated) as individuals, and no
one individual learns all the information available
within his or her society. Indeed, as Anthony F. C.
Wallace (1970, pp.109–120) showed, social adaptation
for all peoples requires an organization of cognitive
diversity such that the information within each per-
son’s mindbrain becomes functionally integrated with
the information located in the mindbrains of others.
In other words, members of a society can learn what-
ever they need to know to be recognized and functioning
member of the society, but that does not mean that
any one member controls all the information in his or
her cultural information pool. As Goodenough (1954,
p. 36) wrote,
As I see it, a society’s culture consists of whatever it
is one has to know or believe in order to operate in
a manner acceptable to its members, and to do so in
any role that they accept for any one of themselves.
Culture, being what people have to learn as distinct
from their biological heritage, must consist of the
end product of learning: knowledge, in a most gen-
eral, if relative, sense of the term. By this definition,
we should note that culture is not a material phe-
nomenon; it does not consist of things, people,
behavior, or emotions. It is rather an organization of
these things. It is the forms of things that people
have in their mind, their models for perceiving,
relating, and otherwise interpreting them. As such,
the things people say and do, their social arrange-
ments and events, are products or by-products of
their culture as they apply it to the task of perceiv-
ing and dealing with their circumstances. 
In postulating such a strict demarcation between “cul-
ture” and “material phenomena,” what Goodenough
and most other cultural anthropologists have neglected,
of course, is that the organ of culture, the organ of
learning, is the human nervous system. Cultural
anthropologists have long assumed an unwarranted,
ethnocentrically biased mind-body dualism that is no
longer tenable in the age of modern neuroscience. It is
the mindbrain that mediates learning, and as such the
learning of culture begins with inherited neurophysio-
logical structures (neurognosis) that in their turn
develop along a growth path that we argue guarantees
a minimal veridicality of perception and knowledge
relative to extramental reality. Of course, neuroplastic-
ity ensures that the neurognostic makeup of each indi-
vidual person will vary to an extent, and so too will the
course of development of each individual over his or
her lifetime. Likewise, the expression and course of
development of these shared neurophysiological struc-
tures will vary socially depending upon the history and
environment of the group’s culture. But it is, we argue,
the underlying neurognostic basis of some forms of
imagery, structure, and thematic motifs that can be
understood as a source of much that is common to
cultures—including those elements that constitute the
eidetic cosmology. Nonetheless, we may still speak of
“culture” as an information pool with considerable
utility, for it allows us to integrate socially influenced
and shared learning into our view from Fisher infor-
mation. Again, it is important to keep in mind that we
are using the term in the broad traditional sense that
includes imagery, sensations, emotions, patterned
behaviors and responses, and thought—in speaking of
culture as information we do not mean to imply an
overly cognitive view of culture, but rather the full
range of ways that human beings can come to know.
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Myth As Eidetic Information
The neurognostic underpinnings of eidetic cosmologyprovide many of the elements that are definitive
of myth, and that we recognize to be cross-culturally
similar, even when extensively elaborated with locally
distinct material. For instance, the changeling in myth
may become a tiger, hyena, wolf, bat, or killer whale,
depending upon the local fauna and the values of a
people, but the structure of the changeling remains the
same—a human being changes mysteriously into an
animal, usually a carnivore. Some of these ubiquitous
qualities of myth have been analyzed and described in
the works of anthropologists and mythologists like
Clyde Kluckholn (1959), Claude Levi-Strauss (1978),
Carl Jung (1964), and Joseph Campbell (1959)—
structural elements like the mytheme, binary opposi-
tion, metaphor and metonymy, archetypal images like
the Serpent, the Tree of Life, the Trickster, and the
Great Mother, and narrative motifs like the hero’s
quest and the “blackening” have been isolated and
identified as cross-culturally recurrent themes (see
Thompson, 1955, for an index of often recurrent
motifs). And as many of these thinkers have them-
selves suggested, these recurrent themes provide
important windows onto some of the basic structures
of experience, culture, and reality.
In this light, we would like to argue that mythical
stories are simultaneously the expression of (1) the
fundamental neurognostic structure of the human
brain, (2) the content appropriate to the varying envi-
ronmental and cultural exigencies characteristic of a
particular society, and (3) an individual’s particularized
interpretations, which are informed by his or her per-
sonal experience and location in a given sociohistorical
system. Of these three determinants of the structure of
myths cross-culturally, we hold that it is the neurog-
nostic structure of myth that comprises a symbolic
representation of the eidetic cosmology. And it is the
eidetic cosmology, in part, that assures the trueing of
knowledge at the level of the society’s information
pool. In common parlance, we are “wired” to know
reality from a very human, species-typical point of
view (d’Aquili & Newberg, 1999)—our very Homo
sapiens-limited I relative to the J of extramental reality.
But the entire “wired” complement of neurognostic
models is never activated in a single individual. With
its initial complement of neurognostic models, the
developing mindbrain is able to mature in such a way
that it resolves the tension between the need to con-
serve its own integrity and the need to organize itself
relative to the sociocultural and physical environment
in which it grows (see Piaget, 1977, 1985). During
development there is a great deal of selectivity among
the repertoire of neurognostic models, only some of
which will mature in the course of any given lifetime
(Edelman, 1987, 1989; Changeux, 1985).
From the point of view of Fisher information,
extramental reality includes both extrasomatic reality
(outer reality), and our own somatic being (inner reality).
This is a crucial distinction, for the eidetic cosmology
is mediated by an organization of neurocognitive cells
that represents in its formations both the invariant
structures of reality and the body’s own internal nature
as part of that reality. In other words, our own being is
J relative to any information I we attain about our self.
The eidetic cosmology is in fact mediated by living
cells that organize themselves during neurogenesis so
as to reiterate with each generation an ancient system
of knowing that has proved to be adaptationally opti-
mal over countless generations. The reality that system
of knowledge encompasses includes our own being, as
well as our environment. And one of the mechanisms
by which this system becomes activated is via its
expression in the society’s corpus of myth. Returning
to the cycle of meaning model, we can see that there is
an embedded neurognostic cycle of meaning that, in
certain contexts, may help to ensure the trueing of the
greater system of knowledge.
The new model resembles the previous one dis-
cussed above, except that it is concerned with the
eidetic cosmology and its manifestations in society’s
mythopoeic system. The eidetic cosmology is
expressed within the society’s distinct symbolic style in
the form of what the German philosopher Wilhelm
Dilthey referred to as “objectified mind,” lived experi-
ence crystalized into intersubjectively accessible and
perduring texts, oral histories, art objects, and symbols
(see Throop, 2002). Here we can think of the eidetic
cosmology as embedded as it were like the figure in
one of those stereographic pictures that one must look
at in just the right way in order to resolve the hidden
image. Through participation in ritual enactments, the
recounting of mythic lore, etc., individuals are able to
translate the eidetic structure’s objectified form back
into the dynamic form of lived experience, which in
turn allows the eidetic structures to penetrate along
with the rest of the symbolism into the depths of the
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brain where they are “recognized” by the target con-
stellation of neurognostic (or archetypal) structures.
Thus neurognostic pathways becomes potentiated for
development (a la Joseph Campbell’s “innate releasing
mechanisms”) in just the right constellation to true
knowledge to the invariant aspects of reality and at the
same time to give knowledge that distinctly cultural
flavor characteristic of the society’s “local knowledge”
(to use Clifford Geertz’s, 1983, apt phrase) as knowl-
edge of self and world matures. The neurognostic
structures in each mindbrain that become potentiated
may also be involved in generating experiences, so that
the eidetic cosmology is not only reiterated in the
development of each developing brain, the individual
may experience the eidetic elements and relations
directly in dreams, visions, or other ASC.11 As is the
case with the culture-level cycle of meaning, the expe-
riences arising relative to the eidetic cosmology act to
confirm and reenforce the “truth” of the cosmology
and bring it alive in direct experience.
One of the most common reactions people have to
the intuition of truth about reality is that it seems as if
they knew it already. And if we are correct in our
assumptions, then in a very real sense they do know
the truth before they hear or experience it—when the
eidetic structures of myth penetrate to neurognostic
networks that are developmentally ready, the experience
may be one of recognition—literally of “re-cognizing”
or “re-calling” what the species has known throughout
the ages within its collective unconscious. For this reason,
a society’s mythology may in effect be poly-developmental;
that is, the mythology may be so organized that it will
effectively potentiate neurocognitive structures at vari-
ous stages of maturation. And, once the constellation
of neurognostic structures is on the path of matura-
tion, the mythopoeic system may re-potentiate the
developing structures at later junctures—may partici-
pate in “initiating” the next stage of development.
Anthropologists have reported a number of societies
that have mythopoeic systems that are explicitly
designed in multiple levels of narrative, each subse-
quent and more complex level given to initiates when
they are developmentally ready to receive it.12 Of
course this has been the initiation strategy of many of
the Western mystery schools in their programs of ini-
tiation and spiritual development.
Thus we are able to conceptualize eidetic cosmol-
ogy in terms of Fisher information. We can see that I
may reside both in the individual mindbrains of soci-
ety’s members, and when shared with others, in the
society’s information pool. We may also see that each
level of I (individual and cultural) interacts as part of a
single process (1) by means of which individual mind-
brains become penetrated and potentiated by various
elements of the eidetic cosmology, and (2) by means of
which each society’s information pool remains
informed by the living experience of eidetic cosmology.
As long as a living eidetic cosmology is reiterated in
each generation, this natural neurognostic cycle of
meaning will guarantee an adaptively optimal mini-
mization of the discrepancy between I and J, regardless
of what other localized elaborations may attend the
more transcultural attributes of knowledge. This sys-
tem maintains its natural adaptational role and allows
local elaboration that may imagine cognized realities
having minimal or no existence in extramental reality.
In other words, mindbrains may generate, and infor-
mation pools may perpetuate all sorts of information
having little or no isomorphism with J, and as long as
these do not increase the discrepancy between I and J,
biological adaptation will not be diminished.13
Alternative States, the Information Pool,
and Fisher Information
Let us return now to the main theme of this study.The central question is how does this neurognostic
cycle of meaning remain intact through the genera-
tions? How does it continue to operate to maintain an
adaptively optimal range of discrepancy between
knowledge and extramental reality? And how does it
operate to maintain a balance in knowledge about the
inner reality of being and the outer reality of environ-
ment? 
One of the major, and quite natural ways that
these features are maintained through time is by social
prescription of ASC in each generation—what might
be considered a special case of Durkheim’s “collective
effervescence.” There are two fundamental attributes
of the kind of ASC in which we are presently interest-
ed that need to be underscored. Whether the ASC be
lucid dreaming as among the Australian Aborigines,
trance states arising in rituals like the Native American
Sundance, peyote journeys of Native American
Church rituals and Huichol ceremonies, vision quests
among plains Indian groups, or jhana or “absorption”
states among Buddhist or western mysteries medita-
tors, an ineluctable ingredient of these experiences
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involves engagement with neurognostic or eidetic
structures of the mindbrain (the inner being or inner
J), and other elements of eidetic cosmology (both
inner and outer J). Practitioners experience various
aspects of eidetic cosmology—perhaps a state of unity
with nature, visions of spirits or gods, an enhanced
sense of the divine, or dissolution of ego boundaries
and enhanced connection, empathy, and compassion
for one’s fellows. Not all the transculturally shareable
ingredients of eidetic cosmology are present in an ASC
at any particular time, but some inevitably will be, and
these will act to provide numinous evidence of that
deeper “mystical” sense of the nature of what is other-
wise a normally hidden reality. These elements recorded
in the society’s information pool, in stories and songs
and dramas, take on flesh as it were and become exis-
tential realities. The cultural information is now no
longer merely received knowledge, but directly experi-
enced knowledge—in other words, very “real.” 
A member of the Native American Church once
told anthropologist J.S. Slotkin (1958, p. 484), “The
White Man talks about Jesus, we talk to Jesus.” The
distinction here is crucial. In those societies that value
and encourage or require each member to seek ASC by
ritual means, a characteristic balance is struck between
knowledge of the world and the knowledge of self—so
much so that the cosmologies of these societies
frequently place the human body in the center of the
universe – and encode a microcosm-macrocosm rela-
tionship between being and world.
Types of Culture
But not all cultures are the same in this respect.Obviously so, for, as the quote from the Native
American Church member implies, our own extremely
materialistic culture does not fit this picture. The
dominant values in Euroamerican culture abjure and
even prohibit members from seeking ASC. Indeed, our
nations are all but schizoid about psychotropic drugs,
using them by the ton for psychiatric purposes and
putting people in prison for using them for “entertain-
ment,” alternative healing, or spiritual purposes. There
are deep cultural, historical, and political reasons for
this attitude toward altering consciousness, having to
do with maintaining the range of states of conscious-
ness requisite for the functioning of materialist/capi-
talist society. Let us examine this issue a bit further so
as to better understand the relationship between ASC
and eidetic cosmology.
Cultures privilege modes of knowing in different
ways. Some cultures will emphasize knowing in ways
that accord with eidetic cosmology, while others will
emphasize knowing in the local, empirical sense. And
many societies are characterized by systems of knowl-
edge that privilege both modes of knowing to one
extent or another. Sociologist Pitirim Sorokin (1957,
1962) has modeled these distinctions in an interesting
and dynamic way. Sorokin has shown that what he
calls sensate cultures are those that privilege empirical,
material ways of knowing external reality over know-
ing in the spiritual or eidetic cosmological way. Sensate
cultures are interested primarily in the material world
of the senses, and do not encourage or foster knowing
of inner being by way of dreams or other esoteric
means. Thus such cultures produce populations that
are off-balance in their understanding of the world and
the self. Because they are off balance, sensate cultures
will tend over the course of generations to compensate
by swinging back toward a more balanced view in
which knowledge derived from the local material
mode becomes integrated with knowledge arising
from development of the eidetic cosmological mode
(what he termed idealistic cultures). This compensatory
swing toward a greater balance between sensate and
idealistic values seems to be happening in
Euroamerican culture at the present time with an
increasing tolerance for mysticism, and with the rise of
an enormous variety of New Age cults and spiritual
movements. The problem, of course, is that cultures
never stand still, and the balance struck in one gener-
ation between local and transcultural ways of knowing
may be lost to subsequent generations in the contin-
ued swing of the culture toward the opposite pole of
ideational culture in which eidetic, more “mystical”
ways of knowing are privileged at the cost of empirical,
pragmatic ways of knowing. It is in the balanced ide-
alistic and more mystical ideational cultures in which
a corpus of mythological tradition forms a living core
of knowledge, and in which ASC are often encouraged
and even prescribed. But of course, extremely
ideational cultures are equally off balance and the
demands of balance eventually require a compensatory
swing in the other direction, back toward the middle
ground of idealistic culture and thence perhaps back
into sensate culture.
From the point of view of people in an ideational
culture, what we in sensate cultures might consider
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“mystical” knowledge or experience is not mystical at
all. It is simply “the way things are.” After all, the
English word “occult” just means “hidden from view”
or “hard to see.” When we experience and compre-
hend the mysteries, they are no longer hidden, and
hence no longer “occult.” As we have argued, the
human mindbrain is neurognostically prepared to
apprehend the mysteries, but it is perhaps to the extent
that we have been enculturated not to do so (for
instance, to ignore our dream life) that we must apply
effort and exotic techniques to produce mystical expe-
riences (say, learn to apprehend and interpret our
dreams, to meditate, or to twirl in Sufi dancing). One
of the characteristics of a sensate culture is that it will
not exhibit a living mythology, while a society out on
the ideational pole will relate everything of importance
back to the culture’s mythological tradition and core
symbolism. As we have seen, a member of an ideation-
al culture has the opportunity to be enculturated into
the eidetic cosmology by way of the group’s corpus of
sacred stories, which often involves rituals designed to
evoke ASC.
As we say, the mindbrain is born knowing the
world in both the unitizing mode of eidetic cosmology
and in the particularizing, empirical mode of local
adaptation. During its maturation, the mindbrain will
strive to establish a resolution of the tension produced
by these two ways of knowing. But our brain is a liv-
ing system of cells, and if the press of environmental
and social conditions result in an over-emphasis upon
localized adaptational development—which is a con-
dition that seems endemic to sensate cultures—the
inherent processes of socio-psycho-somatic integration
will tend to reassert their activities wherever possible.
Such compensatory activities may be experienced by
the individual as spontaneous “mystical” dreams,
visions, spirit possession or entity channeling, and
other transpersonal phenomena—perhaps as Carl Jung
taught, a calling to greater attention to the deeper
workings of the psyche (Dourley, 1998). In the
absence of a corpus of sacred stories, these experiences
may produce confusion and uncertainty for the indi-
vidual having them. A society that has a sensate culture
and which has lost touch with its mythological tradi-
tion is awkwardly positioned to guide its people to a
way of life in keeping with the more unitary aspects of
reality and experience of self. Indeed, spontaneous
transpersonal experiences may be greeted by negative
sanctions, the individual experiencing these phenomena
being perhaps labeled as “crazy,” “dangerous,” a
“kook,” and so forth.
Spiritual Movements in Modern
Sensate Society: Toward Integration?
The problem with sensate cultures is that they arerelatively monophasic in their view—that is, sen-
sate cultures value information attained in only one
state of consciousness, namely what we call “normal
waking consciousness.” Idealistic and ideational cul-
tures by comparison are relatively polyphasic in their
evaluation of alternative states of consciousness—they
value information from a variety of states of conscious-
ness, and tend to pay close attention to states such as
lucid dreams, trance states, possession states, shamanic
journeys, etc. Yet modern postindustrial societies are in
many ways more variegated than the social systems we
have studied in the past. While the dominant values of
Euroamerican society are those of sensate culture, one
of the great advantages (and in some contexts disad-
vantages) of living in modern society is that one may
opt out of the dominant sensate world view and seek
what might be characterized as a path to greater “bal-
ance” in self-understanding. In fact many people today
follow a variety of spiritual movements ranging from
eastern traditions like tai chi, Sufism, and Buddhism,
and aboriginal paths like neoshamanism and the
Medicine Wheel, to western European approaches like
Wicca, Rosicrucianism, Jungian analysis and “rave”
culture. Some paths are derived from ancient tradi-
tions, others from recent innovations, and of course
one will find a variety of symbolism and values
expressed in each. But one thing that all of these move-
ments have in common is that they espouse a polypha-
sic orientation—they positively value discrete ASC
which are interpreted in the ways we have suggested in
this study. They all seek wisdom by way of procedures
that are designed to evoke ASC, and when these do
occur, they are treated as valued sources of information
about the self and the normally hidden aspects of
external reality, which in due course are interpreted
according to their respective world view. The motive
power being facilitated by these social movements is
apparent: The inherent drive of the mindbrain to min-
imize the discrepancy between the knowledge of self
and world its structures mediate (I), and the nature of
extramental being and reality (J).
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Conclusion
Our argument is fairly complete and reasonablystraightforward. Let us briefly summarize the
high points of the theory, and then we can close with
some few inferences drawn from it. We have noted the
ubiquitous importance of alternative states of con-
sciousness among the world’s cultures, and have pre-
sented an explanation for this fact. The explanation
draws upon Fisher information, which conceives of
extramental reality as a repository of information J,
which is in large part unavailable to the human mind-
brain. But the mindbrain is designed to model reality
in the interests of adaptation and develops a system of
information I about reality. Moreover, consciousness
evidences a patterned drive to minimize, as far as pos-
sible, the discrepancy between I and J. Due to the fact
that the mindbrain is a finite information storage and
retrieval system in an over-rich information environ-
ment (J), I can never equal, but can only remain par-
tially isomorphic with J (see Scriven, 1977).
Human beings, a species of social primate, derive
much of their I from their society’s culture, or infor-
mation pool, which is in turn filtered through the lens
of their personalized interpretive frames. Thus there is
an intimate interaction between the adaptational drive
of the individual mindbrain, the corpus of informa-
tion made available by the group’s culture, and the
knowledge accrued by individuals in the context of
their unique personal histories. The world views of
many of the world’s cultures are informed to some
extent by transcultural attributes of an eidetic cosmol-
ogy—which is to say the inherited, species typical,
archetypal knowledge about extramental reality,
knowledge that is (so to speak) “wired into” the infant
mindbrain, and that includes self-awareness and
knowledge of the individual’s own being. Moreover,
societies commonly encourage or require their mem-
bers to participate in rituals that are designed to evoke
ASC, and the interpretation of these extraordinary
experiences is at least partially informed by the soci-
ety’s cosmological world view. Because of certain fun-
damental attributes of ASC, such experiences may
operate to minimize the discrepancy between the soci-
ety’s world view (I) and the nature of extramental real-
ity (J). In other words, in certain contexts ASC may
operate as truers of I, and through a complex social sys-
tem, the world view. Utilizing ASC, cultures are able
to effectively maintain a minimal level of realism in the
interests of adaptation to an ultimately transcendental
reality. 
We want to quickly point out, however, that not
all ASC experiences are necessarily wholesome in this
sense. Everything depends upon the social and envi-
ronmental circumstances attending the experience.
There are of course instances where ASC may have the
opposite effect—that of decreasing the correspondence
between I and J. But anthropologists have long known
that socially important ASC tend to occur within the
context of ritual circumstances in which the group is
in control of both the conditions of evocation of
extraordinary experiences and the interpretation of
such experiences when they do occur, for example,
trances occurring during Sundance Religion cere-
monies (Jorgensen, 1972). The intent of social control
of ASC is to place the socially proper interpretive spin
on ASC in the interests of the commonweal—in the
interests of completing the cultural cycle of meaning. 
There are a number of implications of this theory
for the study of culture, religion, social issues, and the
anthropology of knowledge. We do not have the space
here to explore all of them, but we will suggest one of
the more important implications before closing.
ASC Trueing and 
The Evolution of Culture
Perhaps one of the most important implications ofthe present theory pertains to the relationship
between culture and extramental reality. We have seen
that ASC may operate as truers of a culture’s world
view—an inherent process we may call ASC trueing.
Of course there are other processes that operate in a
similar way to true culture, among them an inherent
pragmatism in all social animals with mindbrains that
rely upon learning for adaptation (Laughlin &
d’Aquili, 1974; Changeux, 1985; Edelman, 1987,
1989). But few of these other mechanisms true knowl-
edge pertaining both to inner and to outer reality,
being, and environment. Given what appears to be the
ubiquitous presence of ASC trueing, one might sus-
pect, as have Michael Winkelman (2000), Paul
Devereux (1992, 1997), and others, that the inherent
drive to ASC has been with us a very long time.
Indeed, although it would be hard to prove short of
owning a time machine, there is reason to suppose that
ASC have been important to human society at least
back to the beginnings of the Upper Paleolithic, some
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35 to 40 thousand years ago. Our suspicion is that the
reliance upon ASC truing began to emerge as the
human mindbrain reached the point in its evolution
when it was capable of generating I’s that were suffi-
ciently out of accord with J that the mindbrain cogni-
tive functioning could become maladaptive. The trou-
ble with having an advanced mindbrain in an animal
that relies heavily on social adaptation strategies is that
everyone in the group has to be more or less on the
same page in order to facilitate social action. In lower
animals, it is neurognosis, common development, and
experience that guarantee an adaptive information
pool. But human beings are capable of a great plastic-
ity of views, and more importantly, may imagine real-
ities unconstrained by perceptual experience. Seriously
divergent I’s would make a socially shared world view
and concerted social action difficult to attain. In other
words, the more complex the brain,14 the more it is
capable of imagining worlds that do not in fact exist.
We argue that in this context, selection would favor
mechanisms that allowed for the greater communica-
tive advantages inherent in an advanced, ever more
complex mindbrain, while making sure that both indi-
vidual and socially shared I’s remain minimally dis-
crepant from J (see Laughlin & d’Aquili, 1974). 
The ramifications of this view are important to
our understanding of the evolution of culture. For, on
the present account, culture does not evolve. Culture
is an abstraction we anthropologists use to label a pool
of shared information carried around in the bodies and
brains of a society’s members. In point of fact, only
bodies evolve. Moreover, what has evolved is the organ
of culture, the hominid nervous system, and with it
the capacity to generate I’s of increasing complexity,
no longer constrained by the world of experience in
the perceptual “now.” 
The evolution of culture has been a matter of cen-
tral concern to anthropologists for well over a century
and a half, but heretofore our understanding of culture
has been biased toward the socially shared information
pertaining to outer reality—the ever-changing physical
world to which humans have had to adapt in order to
survive, and the social relations obtaining between
members of society. Great attention has been given to
family and kinship relations, and to the manufacture
of tools, shelters, clothing, and other items critical to
subsistence and protection from the environment. But
extramental reality (J) is far vaster than social organi-
zation, the local environment, and local knowledge. As
we have seen, the extramental world is the universe
and that universe includes our very being. Natural
processes of trueing involve both the local environ-
ment of social and physical relations, and the rest of
reality—including the universe, our body, and its
mindbrain.
What the present theory requires us to consider
are the social and technological ramifications of true-
ing to inner reality—the world often referred to in the
ethnographic literature as the “world of spirit,” or in
depth psychology as the “collective unconscious.” We
do not have the space here to address this issue in the
detail it deserves, but we can suggest some directions.
As we have reasoned above, the process of trueing very
likely has involved socially prescribed ASC for at least
the last 40 millennia, and probably longer. This is evi-
dent in the shamanic use of ritual, iconography and
sometimes psychotropic drugs that has left its mark on
cave and rock art for thousands of generations.
Methods that used ritually situated symbolism to
potentiate and evoke ASC were likely a common fea-
ture in these rituals. This raises the interesting question
about the origins of psychoactive iconography. 
Our good friend and colleague, Paul Devereux
(1992, 2000), has thought a lot about this question.
He has pointed to the significance of simulacra for
unlocking some of the sacred experiences had by long
dead peoples. According to Devereux, a simulacrum is
“the illusory image of a face, castle, animal, human fig-
ure or other shape or form seen in the chance config-
urations of clouds, the coals of fire, the bark of a tree,
reflections in water, the cracks, crevices and projec-
tions of a rock face, or other surface” (2000, p.157; see
also Michell, 1979, for a cross-cultural compendium
of simulacra). Cultures all over the planet recognize
sacred places that are named for these chance resem-
blances; for instance, Sleeping Ute Mountain in
Colorado, the Paps (meaning breasts in Gaelic) of Jura
in the Hebrides, or the Grandfather and Grandmother
rocks on Samui Island off Thailand. The neuropsy-
chology of this phenomenon seems clear enough. The
human brain is designed to apperceive whole events
and objects from partial information. The mindbrain
abstracts patterns of sensory information and makes
sense of them. We never have all the possible informa-
tion about anything we identify—indeed, taking
Fisher information seriously, we can never have all of
the information about anything. A flash of yellow in
the grass becomes a lion on the prowl, and everyone
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heads for the trees. Whether or not an actual lion is
present, the reaction is adaptive, for the brain does not
have to take the time for the full presence of the lion
before it makes a judgement and takes action. 
The implications of these humble beginnings of
symbolic cognition are quite significant, for it seems
highly likely that the evolution of psychoactive iconog-
raphy ran something like this: The natural facility of
the mindbrain to apperceive whole objects from par-
tial sensory data—a proclivity that among other things
allows the evolution of various kinds of imitative adap-
tations among animals (e.g., moths whose wing patterns
look like owls)—eventually led to the recognition in
simulacra of forms considered vital to individual devel-
opment and an adaptive world view of the group.
Perhaps individuals began to recognize—literally rec-
ognize—or apperceive natural objects as symbols
linked to salient emotional, intuitive, imaginative, and
cognitive associations associated with psychological
and sociocultural concerns. They recognized in natural
formations the images of group leaders, archetypal
dream figures, or figures encountered after consuming
psychoactive plants. Because these images were consid-
ered powerful, numinous and sacred (i.e., related to
mythic lore), so too were the evocative natural features
in the environment. The landscape itself became
deeply redolent with symbolic-cosmic meaning, rich
with the suggestive power of spiritual significance
(Devereux, 1992). Through the evocative power of
simulacra, features in the local environment could
have operated as a truer to both external and internal
reality, bringing both into accord by way of shared
symbolism, and perhaps even as ritual drivers produc-
ing ASC. By way of ASC, or symbolism associated
with ASC-related experiences, such simulacra could
accrue the power to actually evoke elements of the
eidetic cosmology and attendant numinosity by them-
selves. For instance, these simulacra might have evoked
experiences which brought to mind the existence of
such eidetic elements as divine presences, invisible
domains, and multiple realities, for in recognizing
salient symbolic images in what would otherwise be
considered inanimate natural objects, individuals
might have come to perceive the mysterious workings
of causally efficacious hidden forces and beings.
Moreover, that features evident to sensory perception
could possibly index extrasensory realms of causality
may have given rise not only to the idea that there was
more than one reality, but that there was also some sig-
nificant connection between sensory and extrasensory
realities. This may well have led to the first pilgrimages
in which natural features became associated with pow-
erful beings and events that occurred in mythic times.
Thus the landscape became “sacred” and movement in
and around simulacra could operate to remind (literal-
ly re-mind; reproducing ASC-related experiences) par-
ticipants of the crucial connection between contempo-
rary and mythic times. 
As hominids became technically more advanced
and proficient, they became capable of altering and
elaborating simulacra and the landscape to enhance
the evocative power of the natural features. Perhaps
they built additional features—i.e., altered the
acoustics of caves and other chambers to enhance the
effects of singing and chanting (Jahn, Devereux &
Ibison, 1996)—added artistic imagery to cave walls
and sacred landmarks for the purposes of initiation,
pilgrimage, and so forth. Thus the facility of the sim-
ulacra and landscape for evoking ASC within ritual
contexts, and as reminders of such experiences,
became elaborated and more effective at renewing the
associations between individual experience, cosmology,
and reality within an emotional context of numinosity
(or Durkheim’s “collective effervescence”). Eventually,
of course, hominids became so technically proficient
that they could produce spiritually significant objects
from raw materials, and thus free themselves from nec-
essary dependence upon simulacra—although we are
quick to add that simulacra remain with us to the present
day—these became sacred icons in the more modern
sense. Architecture and iconography came to prevail in
human symbolism—in some cultures tied in with
notions of a sacred landscape (e.g., Chinese fung sui),
and in other cultures with little, if any reference to
landscape or simulacra. 
Final Remarks
There are other implications of the theory of ASC
trueing, among them an exhortation for greater atten-
tion being paid during fieldwork to the relationship
between extraordinary experience and cultural world
view. Also, implications include the indication of a
more central role of spiritual art in mediating between
culture and experience—especially art and ASC—and
the necessity of examining more closely those states of
consciousness facilitating contemporary scientific and
philosophical insights into the fundamental structures
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of reality. But we wish to leave the reader with the sub-
mission that focusing upon the aspect of information
in experience, culture and reality may be a productive
line of inquiry, for it allows us the currency of
exchange between various domains of discourse (i.e.,
between individual experience, the intersubjectivity of
sociocultural life, and extramental reality) without cre-
ating methodologically paralyzing gaps between mind
and body, mental and physical, and individual and
social. If all of these domains are seen as repositories of
information, and if information may be defined in
such a way that each domain is translatable into the
others, then there is the possibility of building theories
that integrate knowledge of these various domains into
a more unified view. From our present perspective,
perhaps the best route to follow in building really
robust anthropological theory is to ground future
research in a cultural neurophenomenology that
remains in accord with Fisher information.
Author Note
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End Notes
1. In using the term “traditional” we are referring pri-
marily to peoples who participate in nonindustrial
modes of subsistence. It is important to note that by
utilizing this adjective we do not wish to imply that
these societies are in any sense “timeless” or impervious
to historical, political, or social change. Indeed, the
“traditions” found in “traditional societies” are just as
likely as “traditions” found in industrial and post-
industrial societies to undergo processes of transforma-
tion. As Obeyesekere (1981) has made clear in his
important work on personal symbols, the subjectifica-
tion of culture that provides a potential basis for ensu-
ing cultural transformation is a process that occurs in
all cultures, regardless of the form of their sociopoliti-
cal organization. 
2. It is not the place to argue for metaphysical realism.
Rather, we assume realism, and furthermore contend
that any useful science is grounded upon some form of
realism or other (see Devitt, 1991, on this issue).
3. It is important to recall that extramental reality is
not limited to “externally” given percepts for it is also
the case that aspects of “internal” reality (i.e., the
structure of the nervous system) are also “extramental”
in the sense given in this paper. Indeed, when we speak
of structures of consciousness which place important
constraints upon the structures of experience (see for
instance Husserl’s [1950, 1964] discussion of the
protentional and retentional structure of time con-
sciousness), we are referring directly to aspects of the
extra-mental nature of this internal reality.
4. According to Locke (1979[1689]), “primary quali-
ties” are those qualities or powers adhering in objects
that produce phenomenologically accessible ideas and
sensations that reflect the “actual” properties of the
object qua object (e.g. extension, solidity, motion, rest,
shape, size etc.). In contrast, “secondary qualities” are
those qualities or powers that produce phenomenolog-
ically accessible ideas and sensations that, while they
are ascribed to the object, do not reflect the “actual”
properties of the object qua object (e.g. color, taste,
smell, heat, cold). Locke argues that these “secondary
qualities” are causally produced by the action and
interaction of the “primary qualities” adhering in a
given object. Locke’s distinction between “primary”
and “secondary” qualities therefore establishes a logical
“gap” between those ideas impressed upon the mind
that serve to represent any given “material object” and
the indirectly perceived mind-independent “material”
that supposedly underlies and gives rise to those
impressions. 
In his famous defense of his doctrine of immateri-
alism, Bishop Berkeley is highly critical of Locke on
this accord. Indeed, in contrast to this perspective,
Berkeley asserts that the “sensible objects” we perceive
are not “representations” of imperceptible material
objects composed of “primary qualities,” but are
directly perceived collections of mind-dependent
ideas. In other words, Berkeley wanted to advance a
“non-representational” understanding of the percep-
tion of “things” which corresponds to a “common-
sense” rendering of reality as consisting precisely of
those qualities and sensations that are immediately
perceived through our various sensory modalities
(1988 [1710]). Specifically in an attempt to refute
Locke’s distinction between “primary” and “secondary
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qualities,” Berkeley argues that the “ideas we have of
these [secondary qualities] they [Locke] acknowledge
not to be the resemblances of anything existing with-
out the mind or unperceived; but they will have our
ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images
of things which exist without the mind, in an unthink-
ing substance which they call matter. By matter there-
fore we are to understand an inert, senseless substance,
in which extension, figure, and motion, do actually
subsist. But it is evident from what we have already
shown, that extension, figure and motion are only
ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like
nothing but another idea, and that consequently nei-
ther they nor their archetypes can exist in an unper-
ceiving substance. Hence it is plain that the very
notion of what is called matter or corporeal substance,
involves a contradiction in it” (1988 [1710], 56 sec-
tion 9). Indeed, as Berkeley asserts, “when we do the
utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we
are all the while only contemplating our own ideas.
But the mind taking no notice of itself, is deluded to
think it can and does conceive bodies existing
unthought of or without mind” (1988 [1710], 61 sec-
tion 23).
5. As Hintikka argues, “It is important to realize what
is involved in the Husserlian quest of the immediately
given and why it cannot be accommodated by any
dichotomy between our consciousness (prominently
including its intentional acts) and the intended
objects. The idea that something about the actual
world is immediately given to me implies that any
such sharp dichotomy has to break down. What is
immediately given to me will then at the same time be
part of the mind-independent reality and an element
of my consciousness. There has to be an actual inter-
face or overlap on my consciousness and reality. This is
the basic reason why any sharp contrast between the
realm of noemata and the world of mind-independent
realities ultimately has to be loosened up in Husserl”
(1995). “According to Husserl, there is an actual inter-
face of my consciousness and reality, that reality in fact
impinges directly on my consciousness” (Hintikka
1995, p. 83). 
6. Ronald Aylmer Fisher (1890-1962) was one of the
founders of modern statistics—perhaps best known in
the social sciences for the Fisher’s Exact Test. He was
very interested in experimental design and he pro-
posed the view of information that bears his name in
the early 1920s.
7. Fisher information must be considered as distinct
from the more common contemporary sense of
Shannon information. Claude E. Shannon's theory of
information co-opted the term from common parl-
ance for its own particular purpose. And its purpose
was to define information in such a way that: (1)
Information could usefully be applied to problems in
communication and computation technology, (2)
information could be measured independent of the
amount or nature of the energy used to produce infor-
mation, and (3) information is independent of mean-
ing. In his famous 1948 article, “The Mathematical
Theory of Communication,” Shannon (reprinted in
Shannon & Weaver, 1963), then a Bell Laboratories
scientist, defined information in a very special sense. If
knowledge may be represented mathematically as a
distribution of probabilites—a numerical code if you
will that “stands for” knowledge—then information is
“anything that causes an adjustment in a probability
assignment” (Tribus & McIrvine, 1971, p 179).
8. We are using the terms trueing and truer in the
archaic sense of trueing up a wall or door—making
something conform to the way things are. According
to the dictionary, the word “true” connotes that one's
statement is consistent with the facts, is in agreement
with reality, represents things as they really are, or
matches the description of the way things are. In other
words, the sense of the root is “telling the truth” in
both the sense that what one says is consistent with
reality, and that it is consistent with reality as one
knows it to be without deceit (i.e., both a subjective
and an objective connotation of genuineness). The
root also refers to agreement of an act or statement
with some standard, rule, or pattern. The connotation
is that the statement “is as it should be” or correct. 
9. What is subtle about Geertz’ argument is that he
manages to maintain an attenuated form of psychic
unity in the midst of an attempt to champion the cul-
tural determination of the human mind. The key for
Geertz is time-scale. Where most culture theorists have
grounded their arguments for the cultural constitution
of the psyche in historical periods and in differing cul-
tural settings, Geertz attempts to bring culture in the
“back door,” so to speak, by viewing the cultural prod-
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ucts of the earliest stages of hominid evolution as cen-
tral contributing factors to anthropogenesis. This is
not to say that Geertz is not also highly sympathetic to
the effects of culture on everyday mental contents and
processes; he most certainly is. However, Geertz main-
tains that cultural diversity is, in the end, generated by
human minds which share a number of capacities that
were culturally influenced in phylogenesis. 
10. It is interesting to note here how strongly some of
Geertz’ ideas on the extra-somatic nature of significant
symbols and artifacts seem to resonate with Wilhelm
Dilthey’s writings on “objectified mind” (see Throop,
2002).
11. There is very likely penetration to unconscious
structures as well, and in that case they will not be
experienced, at least not at the time of initial penetra-
tion. Unconscious structures may potentiate and
develop but remain dormant from the point of view of
the conscious ego of the developing person.
12. See the literature on the Telefolmin of Papua New
Guinea (Jorgensen, 1980), the Baktaman of New
Guinea (Barth, 1975), the Tamang shamans of Nepal
(Peters, 1982), the Tukano of Amazonia (Reichel-
Dolmatoff, 1971), the Dogon of Africa (Griaule,
1965), and Tibetan lamas (Beyer, 1973; Given, 1986)
for examples of societies with poly-potentiating, devel-
opmentally sensitive mythic systems.
13. This is another way of formulating what we earli-
er termed the “cognitive extension of prehension”
(CEP; see Laughlin & d’Aquili, 1974).
14. A complexity that is (perhaps ironically) at least
partially the result of an increasing necessity for preci-
sion in the service of ensuring mutual intelligibility in
the context of intersubjective communication.
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